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Regional Evidence 
 
 
by 
Sven Anders  
 
 
Abstract: 
Due to increasing concentration and a rapidly changing competitive environment in many 
food markets, it can be expected that farmers and processors suffer from the exertion of retail 
market power. This might the case in particular on those regional markets where small-scaled 
marketing structures dominate. Given this background, it is he aim of this paper to explicitly 
analyse the simultaneous exertion of retailers´ market power in the regional output and input 
markets of a segment of the German meat market. Based on the production-theory approach 
proposed by Gohin and Guyomard (2000) the model parameterizes the retail industry´s 
oligopoly and oligopsony equilibria. Standard market power measures like Lerner indexes are 
computed and selected elasticities of factor supply and industry demand are provided. Results 
suggest that the hypothesis of perfect competition and price-taking behaviour clearly has to be 
rejected. However, estimates of conjectural elasticities indicate retailers´ upstream and 
downstream market power in regional meat marketing is limited. 
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Measuring Market Power in German Food Retailing: 
Regional Evidence 
 
 
1. Introduction 
High and rising concentration as well as increased vertical dependencies in food processing 
and distribution are evident in most industrialized countries. On the other hand, agriculture is 
facing fluctuating and decreasing product prices in many product markets. In particular, the 
example of meat marketing in rural Germany with mostly unfavourable production conditions 
throughout the marketing channel, demonstrates the weak market position of farmers and 
processors. Producers are constrained to be price-takers in both output and input markets and 
face an environment of potential market power exertion primarily by leading German 
retailers. This trend has both caused public concern and increased policy-makers` attention. 
Moreover, agricultural economists have increasingly concentrated on the measurement of 
imperfect competition. Although the topic has been widely discussed, empirical tests on the 
presence of retail market power in food marketing are still very rare. This seems hardly 
justifiable, since the retailing industry, especially in Germany, is the dominant market stage in 
vertical food marketing.  
Following the procedure of most market-power analyses based on the theory of new empirical 
industrial organization the aim of this paper is to breaks down the retail price-cost margin into 
a marginal cost component and a “mark-up” or “mark-down” component using the 
methodological framework proposed by Gohin and Guyomard (2000). The hypothesis of 
perfect competition in German meat marketing is tested against the simultaneous exertion of 
potential oligopoly as well as oligopsony power at the retailers´ market level. For the 
empirical implementation, a monthly dataset on the regional marketing for beef and pork is 
selected. Earlier results by Pfaff (2001) indicate that regional meat marketing in Germany is 
competitive at the producer stage but appears to be less competitive at the processors` and, in 
particular at the retailers` market level. Empirical evidence indicates that the German retailing 
sector is highly concentrated. This offers opportunities to exert market power both in factor 
input and in consumer output markets. 
This paper is organized as follows. A review of the relevant literature and classification of the 
study is given in Section 2. Thereafter, the topic of vertical meat marketing with a strong 
focus on the regional level is presented in Section 3 followed by the theoretical model and its 
empirical implementation in Section 4. In section 5 an empirical analysis of the exertion of 
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regional market power in German meat marketing is conducted followed by the discussion of 
market power indices. Major results and conclusions are summarized in the last section. 
 
2 Overview of the Literature 
With the prominent trend of measuring market power in new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO), there are many contributions with different methodological applications in food 
marketing. Following the pioneering work of Appelbaum (1982), lots of studies applied the 
production-theory approach of measuring imperfect competition using the concept of 
conjectural variation. Usually, the hypothesis of market power is tested empirically against 
perfect competition and price-taking behaviour. However, while most of the case studies test 
for market power on one side of the market they assume perfect competition on the other. 
This basic modelling framework has been widely used by industrial economists to assess 
market power, most notably in the US food-manufacturing sector. In particular, the majority 
of empirical applications have focused on the highly concentrated meat-processing industry in 
the USA. A common result is that the hypothesis of perfect competition is widely rejected.  
Schroeter (1988) was among the first to consider the case of a simultaneous oligopsony and 
oligopoly market power exertion within an Appelbaum-type framework assuming a fixed 
proportions production technology. Nevertheless, Schroeter found little evidence of market 
power in U.S. meat processing, with magnitudes of the Lerner index and equivalent 
monopsony market power index being close to zero. Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) extended 
this approach, allowing for a more flexible variable-proportions production technology in 
order to test for independent and differing levels of oligopsony and oligopoly market power. 
The authors came up with the interesting finding that the degree of meat packers´ oligopsony 
power in the agricultural input market is significantly higher than in the retail output market. 
Schroeter et al. (2000) applied a multi-output framework which consisted of several tests of 
non-nested hypotheses within a non-linear simultaneous equation model. The results widely 
confirm that the meat-packing industry is virtually competitive. Wann and Sexton (1992) also 
adopted a multi-output approach within a simultaneous equation framework and were able to 
reveal only a weak price increase for processors compared with the outcome of the perfect-
competition benchmark.  
While there are numerous applications of the conjectural variation paradigm to various 
manufacturing sectors, in particular food industries, the retail industry has received only very 
limited attention with regard to imperfect competition. This is hardly justifiable, since high 
levels of retail concentration and merger activity have raised concern about the consequences, 
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in particular, the potential welfare implications of retail market power. As Dobson and 
Waterson (1999) noted, retailing is highly concentrated throughout Europe compared with the 
U.S. However, economic analysis has traditionally viewed the retail level as lacking market 
power. The early SCP-analysis of Cotterill (1986) first tested the hypothesis of a regional 
exertion of market power by U.S. grocery retailers. Studies like Ailawadi et al. (1995) as well 
as Messinger and Narasimhan (1995) again raised the question whether there is a shift of 
market power from manufacturers to retailers. Dobson and Waterson (1997), among others, 
confirm that most areas of retailing display market power. They confirm that retail prices are 
highly correlated with retail concentration, especially when measured at the level of regional 
and local retailing (Cotterill 1986, Bresnahan/Reis 1991). Among the few industrial 
organization surveys in retailing, Hyde and Perloff (1998), Park and Weliwita (1999) ,Sexton 
and Zhang (2001) and Gohin and Guyomard are cases in point. The latter study is the only 
application in Europe.  
A common result is that market power in food retailing is not prevalent per se. In fact, the 
case study results of Hyde and Perloff (1998), as well as Park and Weliwita (1999) indicate 
perfectly competitive behaviour in U.S. and Australian retailing with regard to meat 
marketing. The study of Sexton and Zhang (2001) is more comprehensive in so far as the 
authors use a flexible simulation model of the food marketing channel to account for potential 
welfare effects of successive levels of market power on consumers. A remarkable finding is 
that even in the case of a modest level of market power, when exercised at successive stages 
of a marketing channel, there are dramatic shifts in welfare distribution among the 
participating groups. However, none of the cited studies points to clear evidence of significant 
market power for the chosen retail industries.  
Apart from the few contributions in the Anglo-Saxon literature of industrial economics little 
attention has been devoted to the measurement of market power in Europe. The only studies 
covering market power in European retailing are Körner (2004) and Gohin and Guyomard 
(2000). Körner applies the conjectural variation paradigm for the analyses of retailers` market 
power in the marketing of coffee in Germany, whereas the production-theory approach to the 
French retail sector used by Gohin and Guyomard draws heavily on the quantity-setting 
oligopoly framework of Schroeter and Azzam (1991). This framework captures the case of 
the joint production of demand-related meat products. The authors go beyond the existing 
contributions in so far as they apply a demand system to estimate demand elasticities in the 
simultaneous multi-output model. Due to extensive multi-colinearity, however, the authors 
fail to estimate the demand system and the retail first-order profit-maximization condition 
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simultaneously. The empirical evidence of Gohin and Guyomard is that the French retail 
sector is becoming increasingly concentrated, offering opportunities to exert market power in 
factor input and output markets. However, the study fails to find statistically significant 
results to confirm their hypothesis. Nevertheless, up to 20 percent of the price-cost margin at 
the retail level is found to be due to the existence of market power when compared with the 
perfect-competition benchmark. The authors admit that the hypothesis that French retailers 
exert market power at the aggregate national market level is crucial, and hence a limitation of 
the empirical analysis. As many food retailers operate at the national level, it is likely that 
market power in retailing is often exerted at the regional or local market level.  
Given the background of the cited literature, this study draws on the theoretical framework 
proposed by Gohin and Guyomard (2000). But in contrast, the approach is modified to 
encompass the simultaneous estimation of the first-order profit-maximization conditions of 
the retail industry and linear demand relations. Hence, retailers` oligopsony power and 
oligopoly power are estimated simultaneously but separately for the individual product 
groups, in order to allow for independent measurement of conjectural elasticities. Unlike 
many other industrial organization surveys on market power, which apply three-stage least-
squares estimators the following estimation adopts full-information maximum-likelihood 
estimators. Consequently the framework chosen in this paper is intended to remedy to the lack 
of measurement of market power in German retailing.  
 
3. Market Structure of Vertical Meat Marketing  
Empirical evidence clearly shows that food retailing in Germany is highly concentrated, 
offering opportunities to exert market power on both the factor input and the consumer output 
markets. As a partial indicator of competition the concentration ratio CR10 at 84 percent in 
2002 reflects a remarkable level of oligopolistic concentration. Pfaff (2001) as well as Möser 
(2002) provide empirical evidence of this fact. Continuous price wars among leading 
competitors were further intensified by the market entry of U.S. Wal-Mart in 1997 that even 
boosted competitive pressure within the retailing sector. In particular, discounters gained from 
this competitive environment by expanding their market shares, mainly at the expense of 
medium and small retailers. Their share in total consumer food expenditure increased from 
24.3 percent in 1992 to 35 percent in 2002. In the case of meat and meat products, major 
consumer trends led to an increase in the share of convenience and packaged meat in retail 
stores, which now account for 49,8 percent of all meat purchased by consumers. Since the 
introduction of packaged fresh meat products by leading discounters, additional shares of 
meat purchases are expected to move towards discounters and their leading retailers (Anders 
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2005). Certainly, the competitive position of butchers and small grocery retailers in meat 
marketing is decreasing. On the other hand, there has been an intensification in retail 
competition with decreasing price-cost margins, particularly in the case of meat. Möser 
(2002) shows that meat products are predominantly used in retail promotion activities. 
Moreover, the competitive environment offers no opportunity to pass on cost increases to 
consumers. As a consequence, there is an extensive exertion of market power by retailers 
towards the upstream stages of the marketing channel. 
By comparison, concentration in German meat processing is relatively low at about 40 
percent CR10, while the regional distribution of slaughterhouses in terms of their capacity 
varies strongly. Apart from large-scale slaughtering in northern Germany (> 50,000t 
capacity), only small plants with less than 10,000t slaughtering capacity operate in the region 
studied. Here, approximately 50 percent of slaughter is carried out by small-scale units. About 
40 percent of the pork slaughtering capacity and up to 60 percent of the beef slaughtering 
capacity are not being utilized. Against this background, there is no evidence to support a 
countervailing-power argument at the meat processors market stage. Their bargaining position 
can rather be characterized as a distinct contest for contracts offered by retail groups. This 
disparity reinforces the ability of retailers` to exert regional market power.  
The position of agricultural livestock farming can be clearly characterized as polypolistic, 
pointing to the poor competitive capacity of regional agriculture as a whole, and in particular 
in meat marketing. 
 
4 Theoretical Model and Empirical Implementation 
Based upon the analysis of market structure and competition, Section 4 introduces the 
theoretical framework and its empirical implementation. Considering a non-competitive retail 
industry of N firms producing homogeneous consumer meat products, retailers buy 
corresponding wholesale meat products from processors and employ additional factors of 
production z which are incorporated in the retail distribution process. The retail industry is 
assumed to be a price-taker in the regional factor markets but to exercise regional market 
power in both purchasing meat from regional processors and in selling the final goods to 
consumers. The production technology is presumed to be of fixed proportions, so that the 
processors` input and consumer output can be represented by the same quantity Qi, (i = beef 
or pork). For convenience, and due to the lack of regional firm-level data, the model is 
conducted at the aggregate level of the retail industry 1. The cost function of the retail industry 
                                     
1 The complete theoretical model itself is affiliated at the firm level. 
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is defined as C = c(Q,w,z). Following the procedure of Gohin and Guyomard the total costs of 
retail distribution can then be expressed as:  
( ) iiiii CFzQCQwCFzwQCT ++⋅= ,),,,( ,  (1) 
where Qi is total industry production of meat product i, wi are meat prices on the processors` 
market level and z are additional factors in the retail distribution process.  
The supply function of the upstream regional meat processing industry is given by: 
( XwSQ iii ,= )
)
.  (2) 
X are additional shifters of supply. The final regional meat demand function faced by the 
retail industry is given by: 
( ypDQ iii ,= ,  (3) 
where pi is the consumer price of the i-th final meat product good and y are exogenous 
demand shifters.  
Assuming a profit-maximizing retail industry, the problem is to choose optimal quantities of 
Qi which maximize the aggregate industry profits (4) taking into account their economic 
environment (2) and (3). The aggregated profit function of the retail industry considering the 
distribution of i meat products is then: 
∑
=
∑
=
−−⋅−⋅=Π m
i
m
i
iiiiiii CFzQCQwQp
1 1
),( .  (4) 
Again pi is the consumer price of either beef or pork and wi the price of the meat input at the 
retailers` market level. Ci is the total cost function of the industry and CF a fixed cost term. 
With respect to (4), it is assumed that the meat products i are demand-related but naturally not 
supply-related. Taking the first order condition of the maximization problem and applying 
additional algebra leads to (5) 2: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⋅−⋅⋅⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=∂
∂−− ∑
=1i iiiiiii
i
i
ii QwQpQQ
Cwp ηεθ ,     (5) 
where εi = (∂Qi/∂wi)*(wi/Qi) is the elasticity of supply measured at the meat processors market 
level and ηi = (∂Qi/∂pi)*(pi/Qi) is the price elasticity of final demand at the retail level.  
From equation (5) it becomes clear that the coefficient of conjectural variation θi is the crucial 
conduct parameter. As we know from theory, the conjectural elasticity as shown in (5) 
provides a useful benchmark to test for market power versus price-taking behaviour or the 
degree of competitiveness (Appelbaum 1982). As widely emphasised in the literature, the 
plausible range of θi lies between zero and 1. In the case of θi being zero, the right-hand side 
                                     
2 Cross-conjectural elasticities between the market segments i of beef and pork are assumed to be equal to zero 
and therefore are eliminated from the theoretical derivation.  
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of (5) is equal to zero, and the equation is reduced to the fact that the consumers` price equals 
marginal costs. At the other extreme of θi being one, equation (5) represents the retail 
industry`s optimal condition of a simultaneous monopsony-monopoly situation. Here, total 
marginal costs of distribution are equal to the perceived net marginal revenues. In other 
words, if θi is zero we assume price-taking behaviour of the retail industry in both the 
upstream and downstream regional meat markets. If θi is different from zero, this indicates 
that retailers exert market power at the regional meat market level, being monopolistic and 
monopsonistic in the case of θbeef = θpork = 1. For the special case of Cournot competition, θi 
is equal to the individual market share of each competitor and therefore θi = 1/N 3.  
 
To test empirically for retail market power in the regional market segments for beef and pork, 
empirical functional forms of the above simultaneous model have to be specified. The issues 
of aggregation of simultaneous equation models have been largely discussed by, for example, 
Schroeter and Azzam (1991) and Wann and Sexton (1992). Hence, additional assumptions 
concerning the conjectural variation as well as the cost function have to be maintained. The 
aggregate industry cost function is specified in the Gorman Polar form with constant and 
identical marginal costs with but fixed costs possibly varying among retailers 4: 
CFQHzGQwCFzwQCT i
m
i
ii
m
i
ii +⋅++⋅= ∑=∑= 11 )(),,,( ,    (6) 
where Hi are additional factors in the retail marketing of meat products. 
From equation (7) it is evident that the marginal costs of the final meat product i are constant. 
The next aggregation issue concerns the parameter of conjectural elasticity in equation (5). 
According to Appelbaum (1982), it is assumed that in equilibrium θ is identical across all 
retail firms. The latter assumption, as shown by Schroeter and Azzam (1991), can be achieved 
without loss of generality if constant and identical marginal costs are assured with the 
aggregation procedure. Applying this aggregation procedure to equation (5) leads to:  
∑
=
∑
=
∑
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⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎜
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⎛
⋅⋅⋅+
⎟⎟
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⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅⋅⋅−+=
1 1 1
)(
i i i i
iiii
i
iiiiii
Q
Q
w
Q
Q
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3 A comprehensive discussion of possible interpretations of the parameter of conjectural variation in the 
industrial economics literature is found in, among others, Sexton and Lavoie (2001), Gasmi and Vuong (1991) 
and Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992). 
4 For an extensive discussion of the questions of market power measurement, cost economics and different cost-
function specifications, in particular the Gorman Polar cost function, see Morrison-Paul (1999). 
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θi = θii = Σ(∂Q/∂qi)*(qi/Qi) are average elasticities of conjectural variation with respect to the 
final good output (θi) and the wholesale factor input (θii) as downstream consumers and 
upstream meat processors. Equation (7) is the basis for testing the hypothesis of retail market 
power in the regional market segments for beef and pork. Due to the fact that tests for market 
power either in beef or pork marketing might be carried out separately, the monopsony and 
monopoly coefficients of conjectural variation are not constrained to be identical. To identify 
the various parameters, the empirical estimation has to combine the information in equation 
(7) with the supply functions in equation (2) and the demand functions in (3). For each 
processor`s meat input, this paper specifies double-logarithmic supply functions to account 
directly for the price elasticity of supply ε and to ensure for the simultaneous character of the 
modelling approach. Gohin and Guyomard fail to estimate a simultaneous equation system 
due to the multi-colinearity problems in applying an inverse linear demand system. In 
contrast, this paper specifies double-logarithmic consumer demand functions within the 
simultaneous equation system to avoid such estimation problems.  
The estimation of the simultaneous equation system (2), (3) and (7) uses aggregated monthly 
data for the period 1995-2000. Covering the vertical market stages of meat processing, retail 
distribution and consumer demand, the dataset includes quantitative information, prices and 
cost factors of different stages of meat production and distribution. Other exogenous shift 
factors, e.g. per capita income, are also available. It is assumed that the retail industry 
additionally applies the competitively priced input factors labour, energy and the costs of 
capital, following Park and Weliwita (1999) in this point. Due to the excellent small-sample 
properties of full-information maximum-likelihood estimators (FIML), this consistent 
estimation procedure is favoured over iterative three-stage least-squares (i3SLS) (Hausman 
1975). Like many other empirical studies which apply simultaneous equation systems Gohin 
and Guyomard mostly rely on i3SLS estimators due to their simpler empirical implementation 
(Azzam 1997). To accommodate the large number of coefficients in the case of a joint 
estimation of the equation system and to account for the problem of multi-colinearity, the 
following analysis presents a separate estimation procedure for beef and pork.  
The empirical model of retail oligoposony-oligopoly behaviour in meat marketing at the 
regional level contains the simultaneous estimation of a supply function (QS) and a consumer 
demand function (QD) as well as the profit maximization relation for the identification of the 
important parameters θSi and θDii. 
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5 Result and Discussion 
Table 1 presents selected full-information maximum-likelihood parameter estimates, t-ratios 
and R-squared measures for the retail industry equilibrium condition, factor input supply and 
consumer retail demand functions. The simultaneous equation model also highlights both 
oligopsony and oligopoly market power estimates for the regional distribution of beef and 
pork by German retailers. In view of the importance of the conduct parameters constant 
coefficients θi and θii as outlined in equation (7) would be somewhat restrictive. Rather than 
impose this restriction, the variability of the conjectural variation parameters is tested as a 
function of the retail industry`s ratio of concentration (CR10). With a χ2 statistic of 3.914 for 
the pork model and 2.444 for the beef model the hypothesis that θi,ii are constant could not be 
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (χ2(1; 0,01) = 6.63). Re-estimation of the 
simultaneous model treating θi and θii as constant resulted in the following findings.  
 
Table 1: Retailers´ Oligopsony-Oligopoly Market Power in Regional Meat Marketing 
and Selected Supply, Demand and Cost Elasticities (FIML)  
Test of retail market power in… Estimate t-ratio R2 DW 
Processor supply elasticity                    ε 0.419* 1.79 0.56 2.42
Consumer demand elasticity                η -0.588*** -3.23 0.63 1.79
Oligopsony Market Power                    θS 0.0125* 1.76 
Oligopoly Market Power                      θD 0.0035*** 3.28 
Price of Labour  0.48·10-3*** 4.03 po
rk
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
Price of Capital (index) 0.0232* 1.89 
0.95 1.57
Processor supply elasticity                    ε 1.706* 1.79 0.25 1.65
Consumer demand elasticity                η -2.74*** -6.39 0.67 1.45
Oligopsony Market Power                    θS 0.173 1.62 
Oligopoly Market Power                      θD 0.08*** 4.61 
Price of Labour 0.8·10-3*** 11.19 
Price of Capital (index) 0.246*** 2.68 be
ef
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
Impact of BSE crisis on consumer 
demand at the retail level (elasticity) -0.0172
** -3.62 
0.88 1.39
*, ** and *** stand for the 90%, 95% and 99% levels of significance.  
Source: Own Computations.  
 
Before interpreting the market power results, it should be noted that nearly all model 
coefficients were found to be different from zero at a statistically significant level. Against the 
background of the common difficulty of estimating supply relations, the results in the supply 
functions are remarkable. Both elasticities are theoretically consistent. The supply elasticities 
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are upward sloping in the factor prices of pork and beef, with parameter values of 0.419 and 
1.706 respectively. Likewise, the demand curves are downward sloping in the prices of pork 
and beef. The estimated demand elasticity for beef is -2.74. The estimated elasticity 
parameters is this case have to be viewed against the background of the German BSE crisis, 
which is covered by the dataset. Consumers showed a considerable uncertainty in meat 
consumption in general and reduced their beef consumption almost to zero. The German meat 
market as a whole showed dramatic responses to price changes, as the elasticities indicate. At 
-0.588, the demand elasticity for pork clearly lies in the expected inelastic section of the 
demand curve.  
The equations fit the data reasonably well. The corrected R-squared measurements range from 
0.56 to 0.95, with the exception of the beef supply elasticity at 0.25. Tests for autocorrelation 
are conducted using the Durbin-Watson statistics (DW). For the beef equation model the DW-
statistics range from 1.39 for the retail industry`s optimal condition up to 1.65 for the meat 
processors` supply relation, both lying within the inconclusive region of the test statistics. 
Gujarati (1988) proposes the evaluation of autocorrelation in simultaneous equation models 
using the non-parametric runs-test. Additionally performed runs-tests did not reject the 
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation among the disturbances based on a χ2 statistic for any of 
the equations. The only exception is the retail equilibrium condition for beef, with a DW-
statistic of 1.39. Here the runs-test confirms the existence of positive autocorrelation. 
Of particular interest are, of course, the estimates of oligopsony and oligopoly retail market 
power in the conjectural variation coefficients θS and θD. From Table 1 it is apparent that the 
estimated coefficients of conjectural variation deviate in both markets, and both oligopoly and 
oligopsony specifications devote significantly from zero and hence perfect competition. The 
zero hypotheses of perfect competition and price-taking behaviour are soundly rejected. For 
the retail oligopsony power in beef marketing the deviation from price-taking behaviour is of 
a relatively high magnitude but misses the 90 percent level of significance. In any case, the 
alternative hypothesis of monopsonistic market power (θSBeef = 1) has to be clearly on the 
basis of a t-statistic of 7.74. The case of pork is different in so far as the deviation from zero is 
highly significant but of smaller magnitude.  
Nevertheless, with conjectural variations being around 0.01, the claim that retailers exert 
regional oligopsony market power in the purchase of pork meat, is still somewhat 
exaggerated. Thus the hypothesis of θSPork = 1 is clearly rejected with a t-statistic of 124.25.  
In the case of both oligopoly specifications the picture is different. With values of the retail 
oligopoly conjectural elasticity θD ranging from 0.0035 to 0.08, the deviation from perfect 
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competition in retailers` sales to consumers is comparatively small, although the value for 
beef exceeds the level of pork by far. Again the alternative hypotheses of oligopoly market 
power have to be rejected with t-statistics of 61.76 for beef and 924.15 in the case of pork. 
These findings are very stable across different model specifications. With the deviation of 
greater magnitude than in the case of the pork oligopoly, overall retail behaviour in the sales 
of beef and pork to downstream consumers finally has to be classified as oligopolistic rather 
than competitive.  
For each meat category the degree of retailers´ oligopsony-oligopoly power may also be 
measured by the well-known Lerner index as the relative monopoly price distortion which 
Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) express as L = θD/η. Within the scope of a simultaneous 
bilateral market power measurement, Schroeter (1988) additionally proposes the application 
of an index of the relative monopsony price distortion, which he defines as M = θS/ε. Table 2 
presents Lerner indices as well as monopsony price distortions as percentage distortions based 
on mean values of the estimated model coefficients.  
 
Table 2: Retailers´ Monopsony and Monopoly Price Distortions a) 
Indices of market power  
 Beef Pork 
Input market  0.101 (11.235) 
0.030 
(3.093) 
Output market  0.029 (2.987) 
0.006 
(0.604) 
a) The values in parentheses are the calculated percentage deviations of the unit margins for beef and pork 
compared with the perfect-competition benchmark. 
Source: Own Computations.  
 
As expected, the mean values of oligoposony-oligopoly price distortions due to retailers` 
exertion of regional market power are of small magnitude. The values of the monopsony 
market power index are 0.101 for beef and 0.030 for pork, and 0.029 and 0.006 for the Lerner 
index. Accordingly, about 11 percent of the retail unit marketing margin for beef can be 
explained by retailers` monsopony market power, whereas the corresponding value for pork, 
at 3.1 percent, is by far less. The percentage deviations outlined by the Lerner index are of 
even smaller magnitude with values of 2.9 and 0.6 percent. Based on the parameter values, 
the calculated percentage price distortions of beef and pork unit margins compared with the 
perfect-competition benchmark are of virtually the same size, again ranging from 11.235 
down to 0.604 percent. From these findings it can be concluded that the regional exertion of 
retailers` market power in the segments of beef and pork, as well as power with respect of 
consumers, has been minor. The exception is the factor input market of beef. Here, especially, 
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the impact of BSE, resulting in remarkable values of factor supply as well as consumer 
demand elasticity, was of major significance for the measurements of market power. Gohin 
and Guyomard find Lerner indices, as well as relative monopsony distortions, of clearly 
higher magnitude (between 13 and 25 percent) for the retail categories of meat, dairy and 
other products. These authors themselves admit that several of the elasticities used for 
calculation are not statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, this is the only comparable 
study at the retail level for Europe. Millán (1999), in a survey of the Spanish food, drink and 
tobacco industries, also calculates aggregate Lerner indices. The value for the meat sector is 
0.21. In contrast, many other studies use the concept of the Lerner index to access market 
power, mostly in U.S. meat marketing. But in non of these does the analysis explicitly 
concentrate on the retail industry or at the regional market level.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Against the background of high levels of concentration and a rapidly changing competitive 
environment in many food markets, especially at the regional market level and in remote 
regions, the upstream market stages are expected to suffer from the exertion of retail market 
power. Regional agriculture, and especially livestock production in less favoured regions 
where small-scale marketing structures dominate, can be accurately described as being 
polypolistic. In particular, meat marketing in rural Germany shows considerable weakness in 
competitive capability. Producers are constrained to be price-takers in both the output and 
input markets, and they face a potential environment of market power primary in the hands of 
leading German retailers. In the process, consumers also will be affected.  
The aim of this paper, therefore, has been to analyze explicitly the simultaneous exertion of 
retailers` market power in the regional factor and output markets for a segment of the German 
meat market and the product categories of beef and pork marketing. The theoretical 
framework used draws on the approach proposed by Gohin and Guyomard which 
simultaneously parameterizes the retail industry´s oligopoly and oligopsony equilibriums. In 
particular, retailers´ coefficients of conjectural variation in the purchase of meat products and 
sales to consumers indicate significant deviations from perfect competition and therefore 
reflect a strong bias towards oligopsonistic-oligopolistic behaviour. The estimated values of 
aggregated conjectural variation at the industry level, ranging from 0.0035 to 0.1, indicate that 
the perfect competition hypothesis is not valid. The level of regional market power exertion 
by retailers is therefore limited and far from being either clearly monopolistic or clearöy 
monopsonistic behaviour. This is also confirmed by additionally calculated relative deviation 
on the basis of Lerner and monopoly market power indices. However, estimates of conjectural 
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elasticities state that the statistical evidence of retailers` upstream and downstream market 
power in meat marketing is limited. 
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